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We analyzed all ZIKV importations into Texas from January 2016 to September of 2017, 136 including the county and notification date. County-level purchasing power parity (PPP) in US 137 dollars (12); daily temperature data at a 5 km x 5 km resolution for 2016-2017 and historical 138 averages from 1960-1990 (13,14) were also used as inputs to the transmission risk model. For 139 each county and month, we averaged daily temperatures across all 5 km x 5 km grid cells 140 whose center fell within the county; we aggregated 5 km x 5 km mosquito (Aedes aegypti) 141 occurrence probabilities similarly (15 with parameters as defined in Table 1 . We calculated relative abundance of the ZIKV vector 157 based on Ae. aegypti occurrence probabilities as -ln(1-occurrence probability), and interpret this 158 as a relative (rather than absolute) abundance, which is sufficient for our R 0 estimation (6). We 159 derived a priori county-month R 0 distributions by drawing 1,000 Monte Carlo samples from each 160 underlying parameter distribution, with the appropriate county and month data. Finally, we fit 161 gamma distributions to each probability distribution for use as an informative priors. 162 163 Figure 1A -dark grey) . The lack of secondary cases following all 15 importations suggests that 237 R 0 may be lower. Indeed, our updated estimates suggest that the Harris county R 0 is likely 238 below one ( Figure 1A -light grey). Our method leverages such county-level importation data to 239 update R 0 estimates throughout the state (via a scaling factor), based on the assumption that 240 any a priori biases will be similar across counties ( Figure 1B ). 241 242
Baseline importation and transmission risks in Texas 243
Prior to making importation-based updates, our initial median estimates of R 0 across 244
Texas' 254 counties in 2016 range from approximately 0 to 1.5 throughout the year with July 245
and August having the highest transmission risk (Figure 2A) . Throughout the manuscript, we 246 conduct a one-sided test at a 1% significance level and thus consider counties with 99 247 percentiles (upper bounds) that include one to be at risk for an epidemic (R 0 > 1). Initial upper 248 bound estimates reach as high as three, and 119 (47%) of Texas counties are expected to be at 249 risk of a local outbreak in at least one month of the year (Figure 2A, S2 ). When we considered 250 historic average temperatures rather than 2016 temperatures, the projected 2017 risks were 251 consistently lower, with the largest differences occurring during the unseasonably warm 2017 252 winter (Fig S4) . Case importations peaked in July, August, and September of 2016, with 164 253 (55%) of the 298 total 2016 importations arriving then ( Figure 2B ). 
Updated transmission risks in Texas 272
Based on all importations and autochthonous cases that occurred in Texas prior to 273 January 2017, we estimate that all Texas counties have a median posterior R 0 below one (Fig  274  3) . Median estimates range from 0 to 0.29; upper-bound estimates range from 0 to 1.12, with 275 only six (5%) of the original 119 high-risk counties maintaining epidemic potential (Fig S5) . 276
When we assume historic averages rather than 2016 temperatures, we obtain similar results 277 (Fig S6) . 278
In a sensitivity analysis that assumes ~20 times more undetected importations, we found 279 that the estimated risks decreased further (Fig S7) . We also varied the number of detected 280 autochthonous cases in November: as they decrease from one to zero, the estimated risks 281 decrease considerably; as they increase to five, estimated risks increase, with 83 counties 282 becoming at risk for a local outbreak (Fig S7) . 283 Importation events had variable impacts on the posterior estimates, depending on their 289 timing and location (Fig 4) total), we estimate 1.3 (95% CI: 0-7) detected autochthonous cases. These estimates are 317 consistent with the single autochthonous case detected in Texas in 2017 (Fig 5) . The global expansion of ZIKV was declared a Public Health Emergency of International 331
Concern in February 2016, and caused more than 565,000 confirmed or probable cases and 332 over 3,352 documented cases of congenital Zika syndrome. Although it is receding in most 333 regions of the world, ecological risk assessments suggest that previously unaffected or 334 minimally affected areas may remain at risk for future emergence, including parts of Asia and 335
South America (26) (27) (28) . Differentiating regions that can sustain a ZIKV epidemic (R 0 >1) from 336 those that cannot is vital to effective planning and resource allocation for future preparedness 337 plans. To address this challenge, we have developed a simple method for refining uncertain risk 338 assessments with readily available data on disease importations. 339
We applied the method to update ZIKV R 0 estimates for each of the 254 counties in 340
Texas, and found that only six counties have non-negligible probabilities of sustained local 341 transmission. This is a substantial downgrade in expected risk, given that 43% of the 254 342 counties were previously thought to be vulnerable to ZIKV outbreaks. This framework can be applied to update any R 0 estimates using importation data, 391 regardless of the a priori method of estimation. For example, a new approach combining 392 epidemiological and molecular analyses suggests that transmission risk in Florida is subcritical
